# Round 3 K State KM

# 1NC

## 1NC

#### War powers policy analysis is plagued with flawed scholarship based on constructed threats to US national security – these threats reify the power of the executive while resulting in endless warfare – questioning the underlying assumptions of the knowledge presented in the 1AC is critical to creating a base for substantive political change

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Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today’s dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, by way of a conclusion I would like to assess them more directly and, in the process, indicate what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the U.S. faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create of world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of Herring’s national security state, with the U.S. permanently mobilized militarily to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike – at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decisionmaking are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency (one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint)188 greatly outweigh the costs. Yet, although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides – and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be – remains open as well. Clearly technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet, in truth they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments, assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view – such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have – at times unwittingly – reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America’s post-World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that “our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century,” was no longer “adequate” for the “20th- century nation.” For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country’s “preeminen[ce] in political and military power.” Fulbright held that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself “burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.”192 According to Fulbright, the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States’ own ‘national security’ rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principal and overriding danger facing the country. According to the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2009 “[t]here were just 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide” (sixteen abroad and nine at home).194 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers – which have been consistent in recent years – place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger – requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization – such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit ‘national security’ aims highlights just how entrenched Herring’s old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States’ massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions – like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home – shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. This means that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underscores that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of ‘expertise.’ 195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm – the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed, its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’ – marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact – than policymakers admit. If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the r elationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars – emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness – is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants – danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently – it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The p roblem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

#### Economic security discourse attempts to violently re-order the world

Mark Neocleous, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (UK), 2008 (“Critique of Security.” Pg. 101-102. )

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’. Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or economic well-being’, the significant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasize economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’. Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bourgeoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the glove. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere… It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them… to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.” In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about it part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital-accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, economic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere.

#### Soft power is a euphemism for hegemonic coercion

Bilgin, 08 – Pinar Prof. of IR @ Bilkent, Berivan Elis, PhD Candidate in IR @ Ankara, ‘8 [Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis, <http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~pbilgin/Bilgin-Elis-IT-2008.pdf>]

On another level, Nye’s (soft) power analysis is problematic insofar as his own agenda of ‘success in world politics’ is concerned. This is not only because his analysis fosters the false impression that ‘soft power’ is a nice and cuddly surrogate to ‘hard power’, but also because he underestimates the extent to which U.S. soft power is produced and expressed through compulsion. After all, compulsory power is not limited to the use of material resources. Non-material forms of power, such as ‘symbolic power’, may also be used for the purpose of coercing another. Barnett’s analysis of Arab politics is highly illuminating in this regard; during the Arab Cold War ‘symbolic power’ was used by ‘radical’ Arab states to bring into line their ‘conservative’ counterparts by touting the attractiveness of ‘Arab nationalism’ for Arab peoples across the Middle East.51 By failing to inquire into how the production and expression of soft power can also cause harm, Nye does disservice to both his power analysis and his agenda for U.S. ‘success’ in world politics. To recapitulate, in Part I we pointed to the poverty of realist power analysis for taking agents as well as the stockpile of power as pre-given and focusing on decision-making in cases of visible conflict. Following Lukes, we called for adopting Bachrach and Baratz’s conception of two-dimensional power, which would allow looking at instances of decision-making and nondecision-making. Nye’s conception of soft power constitutes an improvement upon realist power analysis insofar as it raises the analyst’s awareness of the ‘second face of power’. For, **the** very notion of ‘attraction’ suggests that there is a conflict of interest that does not come to the surface. That is to say, B does not express its grievances and does what A wants it to do, because it is attracted to A’s culture, political values and/or foreign policy. That said, Nye’s analysis rests on a conception of power that is somehow less than three-dimensional. While Nye encourages the analyst to be curious about those instances of power expression where there is no visible conflict and/or clash of interests, his failure to register how soft power is ‘not-so-soft’ means that his (soft) power analysis does not fully capture the ‘third face of power’. Let us clarify. Lukes understands the ‘third face of power’ as those instances when “A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping, or determining his very wants”.52 Post-colonial peoples’ post-WWII rush towards sovereign statehood may be viewed as an example of the ‘third face of power’ whereby the international society shaped their wants while their actual circumstances called for other forms of political community. That is to say, in Lukes’ framework, B does what A wants in apparent readiness contrary to its own interests. Put differently, by exercising soft power, A prevents B from recognizing its own ‘real interests’. While Nye’s attention to A’s ability to shape B’s wants seem to render his analysis three-dimensional, his lack of curiosity into ‘not-so-soft’ expressions of U.S. power renders his (soft) power analysis two-and-a-half dimensional. This is mostly because Nye assumes that B’s ‘real interests’ are also served when it follows A’s lead. It is true that soft power does not involve physical coercion, but as Lukes reminded us, it is the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial.53 Going back to the example of North/South relations, power is involved not only when the South does not express its grievance because of the absence of opportunities to do so, but also when it seemingly has no grievances as a consequence of the prevalent system of ideas that depoliticizes its status within the international economic order.54 In a similar fashion, Nye is not interested in inquiring into the sources of U.S. ‘attraction’, for he considers the U.S.’s ability to shape the wants of others as befitting the latter’s ‘real interests’. Accordingly, he misses a ‘fundamental part of soft power’, what Bohas describes as “the early shaping of taste, collective imaginary and ideals which constitutes a way of dominating other countries. This includes the reinforcing effect of the social process in favor of American power through goods and values”.55 As such, Nye’s analysis remains limited in regard to the third face of soft power, where the existing state of things is internalized by the actors, and the U.S.’s expression of power seems benign and in accordance with the ‘real interests’ of others. In sum, the limits of Nye’s approach, which could be characterized as ‘two-and-a-half dimensional power analysis’, does not allow him to offer a theory of power that reflects upon its own moment(s) and site(s) of production and ‘not-so-soft’ expression. This is not to underestimate what Nye’s (soft) power analysis delivers. Rather, our aim has been to push his analysis further towards generating a more realistic framework where one’s scope of research is not limited to the acts or inacts of actors but investigates how different actors’ needs and wants as well as their understanding of themselves and their ‘real interests’ are shaped by other actors or by the existing structures.

#### The mindset of endless threats is a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to the constant creation of more threats

**Lipschutz 1998**

Ronnie, Director – Politics PhD Program, UC Santa Cruz, “On Security” p. 8

Security is, to put Wæver's argument in other words, a socially constructed  concept: It has a specific meaning only within a specific social context.[18](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note18#note18) It emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and among them.[19](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note19#note19) To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some understanding of what is "out there."[20](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note20#note20) But, while these interests, enemies, and scenarios have a material existence and, presumably, a real import for state security, they cannot be regarded simply as having some sort of "objective" reality independent of these constructions.[21](http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz11.html#note21#note21) That security is socially constructed does not mean that there are not to be found real, material conditions that help to create particular interpretations of threats, or that such conditions are irrelevant to either the creation or undermining of the assumptions underlying security policy. Enemies, in part, "create" each other, via the projections of their worst fears onto the other; in this respect, their relationship is intersubjective.

#### Security discourse sanitizes global destruction by proliferating symptom-focused solutions to power imbalances—-causes cycles of violence that make global warfare and extinction inevitable—adopt the role of a critical intellectual to question the claims of the 1AC

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#### **This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of ‘scarcity’ in response to ecological, energy and economic crises [critical security studies] in the context of the historically-speciﬁc socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises [historical sociology and historical materialism].** Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conﬂictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. **They are, in other words, unable to addressthe relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics**.84 Hence, **they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale – in the very process of seeking security**.85 In Cox’s words, because positivist IR theory ‘does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it’. 86 Orthodox **IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason – thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence**. Indeed, **the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises**.87 By the same token**, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military–political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural cause**s.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nulliﬁed under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, **the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to ‘securitise’them– and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conﬂict and militarisation responsible for magniﬁed global insecurity. ‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law**. **It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival** itself. **Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military– police measures in purported response to an existential danger**.89 The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system [geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on], phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. **The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms.** Indeed, **orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conﬂicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafﬁcking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism**.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – **the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power**.92 In other words, **the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on**.93 **Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed [given that state power itself is constituted by these structures] deserve protection**. **This justiﬁes the state’s adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism**. 3.2 From theory to policy Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential ‘threat-multipliers’ of traditional security issues such as ‘political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens’. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a ‘stress-multiplier’ that will ‘exacerbate tensions’ and ‘complicate American foreign policy’; while the EU perceives it as a ‘threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability’. 95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, **this ‘securitisation’ of global crises does not render us safer.** Instead, **by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity.** Thus, a **recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conﬂict up to 2050. It warns of ‘resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies’, particularly due to a projected ‘youth bulge’ in the South, which ‘will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy’. This will prompt a ‘return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets’**. Finally, climate change will ‘compound’ these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96 A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘**The implications for future conﬂict are ominous.’ 97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conﬂict.**’ 98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conﬂict due to their rapidly growing populations. A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘**The world’s middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest**.’ 99 3.3 **Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation? Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines.** The previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new ‘outsider’ identities is insufﬁcient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100 But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a preeminence in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, **genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different**. 101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of‘othering’in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation.102 In other words, **genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in accordance with a speciﬁc socio-political programme**. **The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin’s recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction**. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.104 Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated sociopolitical crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new ‘outsider’ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. **It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105 This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence.** This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed ‘outsider’ group vindicating various forms of violence. Conclusions While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a ‘human security’ approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to ‘non-traditional’ security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conﬂict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts – which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies – as a discourse – is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies [which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures]. **This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost – precisely because the efﬁcacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conﬂict per se**. Neither ‘resource shortages’ nor ‘resource abundance’ [in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms] necessitate conﬂict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to con- ﬂict. The ﬁrst is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. **Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them**. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy ‘reform’ is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global ﬁnancial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet **conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to [1] fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and [2] translate** **the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems.** Hence**, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reﬂection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse ‘Others’, newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously ampliﬁed by global crises – a process that guarantees the intensiﬁcation and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences – drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences – is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.**

## Retaliation

#### No accidental launch

Williscroft ‘10 (Six patrols on the *John Marshall* as a Sonar Technician, and four on the *Von Steuben* as an officer – a total of twenty-two submerged months. Navigator and Ops Officer on *Ortolan* & *Pigeon* – Submarine Rescue & Saturation Diving ships. Watch and Diving Officer on *Oceanographer* and *Surveyor*. “Accidental Nuclear War” http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm, 2010)

Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible? This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific acciental series of events take place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by carefully structured and controlled mandatory procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons. Launching a nuclear weapon takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically launch a missile. There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible. Because the time window for key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish, it is physically impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be deliberate. One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later column. Maintenance procedures on nuclear weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first, checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second. This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors happen. Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is removed, a screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing, absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly, always under two-man control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, a minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any circumstances...period!

#### Soft power is a gimmick- only based on GDP not credibility

Doctorow ’13 (Gilbert Doctorow, Research Fellow of the American University in Moscow, “Soft power is largely an American PR gimmick”, May 20, 2013)

The recent nose-thumbing at Russia and China by Professor Joseph Nye in Foreign Policy magazine over the inability of those countries to marshal soft power is flawed in a number of ways that go beyond the methodological weaknesses of his scholarly writings that I have described at length elsewhere.¹ This article is part of Voice of Russia Experts’ Panel Discussion It is curious that Nye insists soft power is purely the work of a free society and cannot be formed or directed by governments like the Chinese or the Russians, when in his own 2004 master work on the concept he bemoaned the cutbacks in US government-financed image projection by the USIA going back to the end of the Cold War. And in the same work he listed steps that Washington should do to promote soft power, including educational and military exchanges, liberalization of visas and the like. I have long agreed with Nye that the Kremlin’s efforts at exercising soft power have often been inept. For example, the Valdai Discussion Club meetings have only flattered fat-cat American academics who, after their photo opportunity with Vladimir Putin, returned home and laid into Russia with even greater vigor from their university and think-tank perches. At the same time, Russia’s cultural icons are genuinely very popular abroad. The Hermitage Amsterdam is a world-class calling card that carries weight greater than the humbler British Council or Alliance Française installations. The Mariinsky Theater, newly launched into a Lincoln Center type complex with the opening of its second stage, enjoys worldwide respect both on tour and at home during the White Nights Festival. Friends in the travel industry assure me that the coming summer season bookings of upper middle-class American tourists to Moscow, St Petersburg and the Golden Triangle are at a multi-year high. There is not much in all of this for the Kremlin to use in furtherance of its foreign policy objectives. But then the fact that Hilary Clinton chose Nye as the State Department’s house philosopher during her tenure did not change the substance of Obama’s foreign policy even if it may have influenced the sound bites. And it could not be otherwise, because soft power is largely a public relations gimmick. Since Nye is an idealist rather than a realist, he systematically fails to understand that soft power is above all a by-product of wealth and success. America’s undisputed power of attraction to peoples around the world (when it is not invading hapless countries) has more to do with its per capita GDP than with any other factor. This explains the passion of ambitious people everywhere to send their children to American colleges, whatever their ratings. It explains the popularity of Hollywood and pop culture and much more. There is nothing wrong with this; it is all understandable in human terms. But it has relatively little to do with vibrant civil society or any beacon of human rights radiating from Washington, D.C. In this respect, the best thing that Russia or China can do to further their soft power is to get richer quick. In the meantime, Beijing and Moscow would be wise to keep their eyes on the ball, that is on their hard power. If you can’t be loved, it is quite sufficient to be respected. 1. The underlying notion of soft power can be sufficiently explained in a sentence or two. Nye has written volumes. However, his “research” is utterly indiscriminating and he is enthralled by new media. See my critique in Great Post-Cold War American Thinkers on International Relations (2010)

## Authority

#### Their heg authors are ethnocentric – two reasons

#### A- Heg causes more conflict than it solves- historical data proves

Human Security Report ’10( Embargoed until 2 December 2010, 11:00am EST Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

**As with other realist claims,** there are reasons for skepticism about the peace through preponderance **thesis**. First, if it were true, we might expect that the most powerful states would experience the least warfare. However, since the end of World War II, the opposite has in factbeen the case. Between 1946 and 2008, the four countries that had been involved in the greatest number of international conflicts were France, the UK, the US, and Russia/USSR.19 Yet, these were four of the most powerful conventional military powers in the world— and they all had nuclear weapons. The fact that major powers tend to be more involved in international conflicts than minor powers is not surprising. Fighting international wars requires the capacity to project substantial military power across national frontiers and often over very long distances. Few countries have this capacity; major powers have it by definition.

#### B-Heg causes colonialist conflicts that turn any reason heg is good

Human Security Report ’10( Embargoed until 2 December 2010, 11:00am EST Human Security Report Project. Human Security Report 2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

But **there is a more serious challenge to the preponderance thesis**. **From the end of World War II until the early 1970s, nationalist struggles against colonial powers were the most frequent form of international conflict**. The failure of the far more powerful colonial powers to prevail in these conflicts poses a serious challenge to the core assumptions of preponderance theories—and marked a remarkable historical change. During most of the history of colonial expansion and rule there had been little effective resistance from the inhabitants of the territories that were being colonized. Indeed, as one analyst of the wars of colonial conquest noted, “by and large, it would seem true that what made the machinery of European troops so successful was that native troops saw fit to die, with glory, with honor, en masse, and in vain.”20 The ease of colonial conquest, the subsequent crushing military defeats imposed on the Axis powers by the superior military industrial might of the Allies in World War II, and the previous failure of the UN’s predecessor, the League of Nations, to stop Fascist aggression all served to reinforce the idea that preponderance—superiority in military capability—was the key both to peace through deterrence and victory in war. But in the post-World War II world, new strategic realities raised serious questions about assumptions regarding the effectiveness of conventional military superiority. In particular, the outcomes of the wars of colonial liberation, the US defeat in Vietnam, and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan demonstrated that in some types of conflict, **military preponderance could neither deter nationalist forces nor be used to defeat them**. **The outcomes of these conflicts posed a major challenge for preponderance theories.** **While preponderance itself may reduce the risk of war**, **the process of trying to attain it increases the risk**. Not only did the vastly superior military capabilities of the colonial powers fail to deter the nationalist rebels from going to war but in every case it was the nationalist forces that prevailed. The colonial powers withdrew and the colonies gained independence. Military preponderance was strategically irrelevant. Writing about US strategy in Vietnam six years before the end of the war, Henry Kissinger noted: We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.21 For the nationalist forces, military engagements were never intended to defeat the external power militarily—that was impossible. The strategy was rather to seek the progressive attrition of the metropole’s political capability to wage war— “will” in the language of classical strategy.22 In such conflicts, if the human, economic, and reputational costs to the external power increase with little prospect of victory, support for the war in the metropole will steadily erode and the pressure to withdraw will inexorably increase. But asymmetric political/military strategies were not the only reason that relatively weak nationalist forces prevailed over militarily preponderant colonial powers in the post-World War II era. In the aftermath of World War II, there had been a major shift in global norms with respect to the legitimacy of colonial rule—a shift that made crushing nationalist rebellions politically more difficult for the colonial powers. In 1942 Winston Churchill had defiantly declared that “I have not become the King’s First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.”23 Less than 20 years later, another British prime minister, Harold MacMillan, sounded a very different note: “The wind of change is blowing through this [African] continent and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.”24 The “wind of change” made crushing anticolonial uprisings fought in the name of self-determination politically difficult for the colonial powers who were after all signatories to the UN Charter that had strongly proclaimed the right to self-determination. Understanding this shift in global norms helps explain the failure of the colonial powers to prevail in the wars of colonial liberation. The anticolonial nationalists had history on their side, plus international political, and sometimes material, support from the US, from European countries that were not colonial powers, and, of course, from the Soviet Union. In many cases power was transferred to nationalist movements without any violence—fighting was often more about the timing of independence than its principle. Traditional realist “peace through strength” theories, with their focus on the importance of material capability in deterring war, and winning if deterrence fails, and their deep skepticism about the importance of ideas as drivers of change in the international system, **have never been able to provide compelling explanations for the strategic successes of militarily weak insurgents in national liberation wars.**

#### Maintaining hegemony accelerates paranoid imperial violence – their obsession manufactures threats and conceals the US’ role in enemy construction – the alternative makes visible power relationships that enable endless warfare

McClintock 9 (Anne, Simone de Beauvoir Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, "Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib," Muse)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of **benign US globalization** and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around **fantasies of global omnipotence** (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) **coinciding with nightmares of impending attack**, the United States has entered the domain of **paranoia**: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both **deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat.** Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,”[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f4) and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. [End Page 51] I have come to feel that we **urgently need to make visible** (the better politically to challenge) those established but **concealed circuits of imperial violence** that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state.[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f5) Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in **collusion** with a complicit corporate media would **render itself invisible**, casting **states of emergency** into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to **reconfigure**, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render **invisible**, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the **uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters**. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f6) Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. [End Page 52] Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the **pervasive presence of the paranoia** that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f7) Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an **inherent contradiction** with respect to power: a **double-sided phantasm** that **oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat**, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce **pyrotechnic displays of violence**. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence.[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f8) Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.”[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.go.libproxy.wfubmc.edu/journals/small_axe/v013/13.1.mcclintock.html#f9) Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around **contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence,** and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an **analytically strategic concept**, a way of seeing and being **attentive to contradictions within power**, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory **flashpoints of violence** that the state tries to conceal. [End Page 53] Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence **erupts from the force** of its multiple, **cascading contradictions**: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of **unspeakable violence**. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty?

#### Economic predictions impossible – small errors can wreck fore-casts

Kaul, 2011 **–** Writer for The Economic Times (Vivek, “The perils of prediction: Why do we believe in predictions even when they fail”, <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-08-12/news/29880664_1_economists-predictions-oil-prices/2>, accessed 7/19/12)//BZ

The perils of prediction: Why do we believe in predictions even when they fail. Experts are making predictions everywhere. In newspapers, on TV channels, and now with the advent of the Internet, on websites and blogs! But a huge number of these predictions are wrong. "There are so many failed economic predictions you could easily fill a library with them. Maybe two libraries," says Dan Gardner, the author of Future Babble - Why Expert Predictions Fail and Why We Believe Them Anyway. "Undoubtedly, the most famous is the unfortunate remark of Irving Fisher - one of the most esteemed economists of the day - that stocks had reached a 'permanently high plateau' shortly before the crash of 1929 (which led to the start of The Great Depression). Then John Maynard Keynes, the famed British economist, told Britons not to worry because the trouble in America wouldn't affect them," adds Gardner. Of course, things did not turn out as the famed economists predicted. In the sixties and seventies, there was a huge debate on what works better, capitalism or communism. A lot of prominent American economists were of the opinion that communism was a better bet. As Gardner explains, "In the 1960s, many esteemed economists, including the Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson, were sure the Soviet economy would surpass the American economy by 1990. When 1990 came, that had been forgotten. Instead, there was virtual expert consensus that Japan would overtake the United States. Twenty years later, that too was forgotten. Instead we have experts who confidently say China will take the lead." Ironically, economists who were bullish on the rise of the Soviet Union were bearish on the chances of India doing well, even though after independence India followed Soviet-style planning. "In the 1950s and 1960s, it was a given that India was doomed. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, lots of very wise people were sure India would collapse and its people would starve. It's stunning to contrast what the 'best and brightest' said about India in those years with what has happened in the last decade," says Gardner. And it's not only economists who have been getting it all wrong. Corporations have been getting their predictions wrong as well. The Anaconda Copper Mining Company was one of the largest copper companies in the world. "The company will still be going strong 100 or even 500 years from now," claimed its President in 1968. But things changed very quickly. "Three years earlier, the brains of two British scientists had figured out how fibre optics could theoretically be a medium of communication. And two years after his boasts, three scientists were able to make fibre optics, a practical technology vastly superior to copper wires. The price of copper plummeted. Facing liquidation, Anaconda sold itself in 1977," writes Gardner. Smart people have been trying to predict the price of oil ever since it became an industrial commodity in the 19th century. Arjun N Murti of Goldman Sachs joined the bandwagon when in March 2008 he predicted that oil prices would touch $200 per barrel soon. In July 2008, oil prices touched around $150 per barrel and Murti was on his way to becoming a superstar. Two months later in September 2008, the stock markets crashed after the investment bank Lehman Brothers went bust. "In September 2008, financial markets melted down, precipitating a dramatic slowing in the global economy. The experts hadn't foreseen this... By December, oil traded at $33 a barrel," explains Gardner. So how do we explain the inability of experts to predict oil prices? All you need to predict is supply and demand, after all. As Gardner says "It seems simple. But when you look closely at what goes into supply and demand - technology, politics, natural events, etc. - you quickly realise the complexity is mind-boggling and even tiny errors can quickly blossom into forecast-destroyers." Despite predictions going wrong all the time, people keep looking for them. Why is that? People have a **psychological aversion to uncertainty** and, as a result, we tend to convince ourselves that we know more, and are more in control, than we actually are. "For example, psychologists have shown that people very easily convince themselves that a random bit of good luck was, in fact, the result of skill. Even when the task at hand is guessing which side of a coin will turn up when it is flipped - the very symbol of randomness - people are easily convinced that their correct guesses were the result of skill, not luck. This is why businessmen seldom even consider the possibility that positive outcomes - or correct forecasts - were actually the product of luck, not skill. And if they don't consider that possibility, they can become badly deluded," feels Gardner. The examples discussed above are isolated ones. What does research have to say in this regard? In the late 1980s, Philip Tetlock, a psychologist, launched the most comprehensive analysis of expert predictions ever conducted. As Gardner says, "After assembling a group of almost 300 experts - economists, political scientists, journalists - Tetlock peppered them with questions. Will inflation rate rise or fall? What about economic growth, the price of oil, the stock market? Will there be an election? Who will win? All the sort of stuff we see in the media. In total, over many years, Tetlock gathered an astonishing 27,000 predictions." And what were the results? "Time passed. Accuracy was checked. Data were crunched. And Tetlock discovered the average expert was about as accurate as that famous symbol of random guessing - the dart-throwing chimpanzee," says Gardner. Some experts did worse than average. Others did better, although they were still miles from perfect. What made all the difference was the experts' style of thinking. "Using terms drawn from a scrap of ancient Greek poetry - "The fox knows many things but the hedgehog knows one big thing" - Tetlock dubbed the two groups 'foxes' and 'hedgehogs'," explains Gardner. Hedgehogs had One Big Idea - one analytical tool - which they used in making all sorts of forecasts. They preferred simplicity and clarity, so they preferred to keep information pared down to what they thought was the bare essentials. And they were confident: Hedgehogs were much more likely to use words like 'certain' and 'impossible'. The kind of experts you typically see on television. Foxes thought quite differently. They gathered information from many sources, looked at issues with more than one analytical lens, readily admitted mistakes, and were comfortable with complexity and uncertainty. They talked about possibilities and probabilities. They often said 'maybe'. And they were humble about their ability to see into the future. The kind of experts you typically don't see on television. Tetlock's data also showed that there was an inverse correlation between fame and accuracy, so the more famous the expert was, the less accurate his predictions were. "That would seem to be the opposite of what should happen, since more-accurate experts should be rewarded with media attention and corporate interest while less-accurate experts should suffer for their failures. But Tetlock's discovery made sense from a psychological perspective. People have an aversion to uncertainty and so what they want experts to do is to dispel uncertainty," explains Gardner. "But the 'fox' expert talks about possibilities and probabilities, not certainties. That doesn't deliver what we psychologically crave and so the fox suffers for it. But the hedgehog is brimming with confidence. He delivers certainty. And so he is rewarded - even though he is likely to be less accurate than a dart-throwing chimpanzee," he adds. So how do we deal with this? As Gardner says "The critical first step is to realise that the craving for certainty is a dangerous trap. There is no certainty. Those who offer to sell it to business are selling snake oil. Once we accept that there is no certainty, we can discuss possibilities and probabilities and we can tailor our decisions accordingly. For example, a decision which pays off only if the particular future we expect actually does unfold, is a bad decision because the likelihood that it will fail is high. Far better is a decision which takes into account a wide range of futures and pays off in any of them."

**Security fears of disease cause emergency measures that are counterproductive at the domestic level and undermine critical international cooperation**

**- Enemark ‘9** (Is Pandemic Flu a Security Threat? Author: Christian Enemark DOI: 10.1080/00396330902749798 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Published in: journal Survival, Volume 51, Issue 1 February 2009 , pages 191 - 214

Most infectious diseases do not attract heightened political attention because their effects are mild, they are familiar to physicians, or their geographic occurrence is limited. A particular disease might be deemed a security issue, however, when its effects impose or threaten to impose an intolerable burden on society. That burden can be measured in terms of morbidity and mortality, **but also in terms of the way in which a disease is perceived by those who fear infection**. The disease described by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as 'the most feared security threat' today is pandemic influenza.1 The next pandemic could cause illness and death on a large scale, over a wide area, in a short space of time. **Such a prospect arguably sets this disease apart from the many others that may be regarded simply as health issues, and some Western governments have started to frame pandemic influenza as a threat to national security.** According to the US pandemic plan, a 'necessary enabler of pandemic preparedness' is that this be viewed 'as a national security issue'.2 The 'National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom' assesses an influenza pandemic as the 'highest risk' civil emergency.3 And under the Australian pandemic plan, which emphasises 'maintenance of social functioning',4 Australians are to receive the best possible health care 'commensurate with the maintenance of a safe and secure society'.5 Historical experience indicates that the world is overdue for an influenza pandemic, and a virus with pandemic potential - H5N1 avian influenza, which emerged in late 2003 - is still out of control. Past pandemics were all the more damaging because they took the world by surprise; however, the stakes are still high in the twenty-first century because increased human interconnectedness facilitates the global spread of disease. In the first identifiable pre-pandemic phase of human history, it makes sense to be thinking seriously about how best to prepare and respond. Yet **as some governments move to prioritise this health issue by framing it in security terms, two risks emerge: firstly, that emergency responses implemented at the domestic level might do more harm than good; and secondly, that placing too great an emphasis on the health and security interests of individual states might detract from the need for long-term international cooperation on resisting pandemic influenza.**

Technological solutions to global warming only ensure further environmental destruction and are destined to fail

Joronen, ‘10 [Mikko, Dept of Geography and Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, U of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space: On Heidegger, Being, and Metaphysics of Globalization, pg 224-5]

Perhaps one of the most striking examples of the need for non-violent resistance and power-free following of the abyssal earth is the contemporary event of global warming. While this devastating change is affecting all parts of the earth, even the atmosphere, some of the most vulgar solutions, especially the geo-engineering proposals, aim at intentional, even global scale, climate modification either by reducing the incoming radiation from the sun – for instance, by using the refractive screens or sunshade of autonomous spacecrafts installed in space [Angel 2006], and by spraying cooling sulphate particle concentrations in the stratosphere [Crutzen 2006] – or by removing CO2 from the atmosphere – for instance, by increasing carbon sequestration with iron fertilization pumped at oceans [Buesseler&Boyd 2003]. These various potential geoengineering implementations seem to do nothing but follow the baseline of the gigantic machination, the subjugation of things into orderable reserve commanded to stand by so that they may be manipulated by the operations of calculation. Even though such geo-engineering may eventually mitigate the negative consequences of climate change, it offers a calculative moulding of even more complex systems of orderings as a solution to the problem of global warming, which is by itself subordinate to, as well as an outcome of, this manipulative and calculative subjugation of earth, the logic of circular self-overcoming in the ever greater modalities of exploitative power. As Malpas writes, although it is evident that more complex systems of orderings also increase the possibilities of their failure, machination always presents itself as a source for continuous improvements by simply viewing these failures as an indication of a further need for technological perfection/////////// [2006:298]. In other words, machination does not implicate an achievement of total ordering, but a drive toward total ordering where this drive itself is never under suspicion. Nevertheless, as contemporary climate change indicates, earth never allows itself to become captured, completely controlled, or emptied into unfolding that frames it in terms of orderable and exploitable standing-reserve. Earth rather resists all attempts to capture it: it resists by pointing out the lack that leads to the failure of all systems of orderings. It is precisely this lack, the line of failure that has always already started to flee the perfect rationalization and total capture of things, which presents the earth aspect of Heidegger. Instead of the calculative engineering of technical solutions, the non-violent resistance allows the earth to become a source of abyssal being, a source of self-emerging things that always retains a hidden element since the earth never allows itself to become completely secured though particular world-disclosures [see Harrison 2007:628; Peters&Irwin 2002:8]. In other words, instead of mere calculative manipulation, we can resist the manipulative machination of earth and thus let the living earth become a source of abyssal being, an earth-site for our dwelling.

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Fiat is illusory**- no coherent reason why simulating the case is good at best the judge too default to what he has control over- the discourse in this round.**

**The status quo disproves the effectiveness of procedural solutions focus – securitization results in a faith in experts centralizes political decision-making while excluding the public**

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Today politicians and legal scholars routinely invoke fears that the balance between liberty and security has swung drastically in the direction of government’s coercive powers. In the post-September 11 era, such worries are so commonplace that in the words of one commentator, “it has become part of the drinking water of this country that there has been a trade-off of liberty for security.” According to civil libertarians, centralizing executive power and removing the legal constraints that inhibit state violence (all in the name of heightened security) mean the steady erosion of both popular deliberation and the rule of law. For Jeremy Waldron, current practices, from coercive interrogation to terrorism surveillance and diminished detainee rights, provide government the ability not only to intimidate external enemies but also internal dissidents and legitimate political opponents. As he writes, “We have to worry that the very means given to the government to combat our enemies will be used by the government against its enemies.” Especially disconcerting for many commentators, executive judgments – due to fears of infiltration and security leaks – are often cloaked in secrecy. This lack of transparency undermines a core value of democratic decisionmaking: popular scrutiny of government action. As U.S. Circuit Judge Damon Keith famously declared in a case involving secret deportations by the executive branch, “Democracies die behind closed doors. . . . When government begins closing doors, it selectively controls information rightfully belonging to the people. Selective information is misinformation.” In the view of no less an establishment figure than Neal Katyal, now the Principal Deputy Solicitor General, such security measures transform the current presidency into “the most dangerous branch,” one that “subsumes much of the tripartite structure of government.” ¶ Widespread concerns with the government’s security infrastructure are by no means a new phenomenon. In fact, such voices are part of a sixty-year history of reform aimed at limiting state (particularly presidential) discretion and preventing likely abuses. What is remarkable about these reform efforts is that, every generation, critics articulate the same basic anxieties and present virtually identical procedural solutions. These procedural solutions focus on enhancing the institutional strength of both Congress and the courts to rein in the unitary executive. They either promote new statutory schemes that codify legislative responsibilities or call for greater court activism. As early as the 1940s, Clinton Rossiter argued that only a clearly established legal framework in which Congress enjoyed the power to declare and terminate states of emergency would prevent executive tyranny and rights violations in times of crisis. After the Iran-Contra scandal, Harold Koh, now State Department Legal Adviser, once more raised this approach, calling for passage of a National Security Charter that explicitly enumerated the powers of both the executive and the legislature, promoting greater balance between the branches and explicit constraints on government action. More recently, Bruce Ackerman has defended the need for an “emergency constitution” premised on congressional oversight and procedurally specified practices. As for increased judicial vigilance, Arthur Schlesinger argued nearly forty years ago, in his seminal book The Imperial Presidency (1973), that the courts “had to reclaim their own dignity and meet their own responsibilities” by abandoning deference and by offering a meaningful check to the political branches. Today, Lawrence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge once more imagine that, by providing a powerful voice of dissent, the courts can play a critical role in balancing the branches. They write that adjudication can “generate[]—even if largely (or, at times, only) in eloquent and cogently reasoned dissent—an apt language for potent criticism.” ¶ The hope – returned to by constitutional scholars for decades – has been that by creating clear legal guidelines for security matters and by increasing the role of the legislative and judicial branches, government abuse can be stemmed. Yet despite this reformist belief, presidential and military prerogatives continue to expand even when the courts or Congress intervene. Indeed, the ultimate result has primarily been to entrench further the system of discretion and centralization. In the case of congressional legislation (from the 200 standby statutes on the books to the post September 11 and Iraq War Authorizations for the Use of Military Force to the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Acts), this has often entailed Congress self-consciously playing the role of junior partner – buttressing executive practices by providing its own constitutional imprimatur to them. Thus, rather than rolling back security practices, greater congressional involvement has tended to further strengthen and internalize emergency norms within the ordinary operation of politics. As just one example, the USA PATRIOT Act, while no doubt controversial, has been renewed by Congress a remarkable ten consecutive times without any meaningful curtailments. Such realities underscore the dominant drift of security arrangements, a drift unhindered by scholarly suggestions and reform initiatives. Indeed, if anything, today’s scholarship finds itself mired in an argumentative loop, re-presenting inadequate remedies and seemingly incapable of recognizing past failures. ¶ What explains both the persistent expansion of the federal government’s security framework as well as the inability of civil libertarian solutions to curb this expansion? In this article I argue that the current reform debate ignores the broader ideological context that shapes how the balance between liberty and security is struck. In particular, the very meaning of security has not remained static but rather has changed dramatically since World War II and the beginning of the Cold War. This shift has principally concerned the basic question of who decides on issues of war and emergency. And as the following pages explore, at the center of this shift has been a transformation in legal and political judgments about the capacity of citizens to make informed and knowledgeable decisions in security domains. Yet, while underlying assumptions about popular knowledge – its strengths and limitations – have played a key role in shaping security practices in each era of American constitutional history, this role has not been explored in any sustained way in the scholarly literature. ¶ As an initial effort to delineate the relationship between knowledge and security, I will argue that throughout most of the American experience, the dominant ideological perspective saw security as grounded in protecting citizens from threats to their property and physical well-being (especially those threats posed by external warfare and domestic insurrection). Drawing from a philosophical tradition extending back to John Locke, politicians and thinkers – ranging from Alexander Hamilton and James Madison at the founding to Abraham Lincoln and Roger Taney – maintained that most citizens understood the forms of danger that imperiled their physical safety. The average individual knew that securing collective life was in his or her own interest, and also knew the institutional arrangements and practices that would fulfill this paramount interest. A widespread knowledge of security needs was presumed to be embedded in social experience, indicating that citizens had the skill to take part in democratic discussion regarding how best to protect property or to respond to forms of external violence. Thus the question of who decides was answered decisively in favor of the general public and those institutions – especially majoritarian legislatures and juries – most closely bound to the public’s wishes. ¶ What marks the present moment as distinct is an increasing repudiation of these assumptions about shared and general social knowledge. Today the dominant approach to security presumes that conditions of modern complexity (marked by heightened bureaucracy, institutional specialization, global interdependence, and technological development) mean that while protection from external danger remains a paramount interest of ordinary citizens, these citizens rarely possess the capacity to pursue such objectives adequately. Rather than viewing security as a matter open to popular understanding and collective assessment, in ways both small and large the prevailing concept sees threat as sociologically complex and as requiring elite modes of expertise. Insulated decision-makers in the executive branch, armed with the specialized skills of the professional military, are assumed to be best equipped to make sense of complicated and often conflicting information about safety and self-defense. The result is that the other branches – let alone the public writ large – face a profound legitimacy deficit whenever they call for transparency or seek to challenge presidential discretion. Not surprisingly, the tendency of procedural reform efforts has been to place greater decision-making power in the other branches and then to watch those branches delegate such power back to the very same executive bodies.

#### Combinations of the alternative and the state result in the cooption of intellectuals into a political, interventionist sphere

**BISWAS 07** (Shampa, Prof – Politics, Whitman, 2007 "Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist" Millennium 36 (1)

While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, **there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process**. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward **Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces**, ‘the one public space **available to real alternative intellectual practices**: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. **The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’** and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, **and** most worrisome of all**, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.**17 **Said mentions** in this context **the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War**18, an area in which **there was considerable traffic of political scientists** (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) **with institutions of policy-making.** Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied **US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’**.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. **It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom.** Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

#### Especially in the context of the apocalypse

Masco 08 (Joseph, ““Survival Is Your Business”: Engineering Ruins and Affect in Nuclear America” Cultural Anthropology, May 2008. Vol. 23, Issue 2)

Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.¶ President George W. Bush, address to the nation on Iraq on October 7, 2002 ¶ Be prepared to be bombed. Be prepared to go back to the Stone Age.¶ President Musharraf of Pakistan, reporting on a message delivered to him from the U.S. State Department immediately after 9/11¶ Reclaiming the emotional history of the atomic bomb is crucial today, as nuclear fear has been amplified to enable a variety of political projects at precisely the moment American memory of the bomb has become impossibly blurred. In the United States, nuclear fear has recently been used to justify preemptive war and unlimited domestic surveillance, a worldwide system of secret prisons, and the practices of rendition, torture, and assassination. But what today do Americans actually know or remember about the bomb? We live not in the ruins produced by Soviet ICBMs but, rather, in the emotional ruins of the Cold War as an intellectual and social project. The half-century-long project to install and articulate the nation through contemplating its violent end has colonized the present. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D. C, in 2001 may have produced a political consensus that "the Cold War is over" and a formal declaration of a counterterrorism project.23 But American reactions to those attacks were structured by a multigenerational state project to harness the fear of mass death to divergent political and military industrial agendas.¶ By evoking the image of the mushroom cloud to enable the invasion of Iraq, Bush appealed directly to citizens' nuclear fear, a cultural product of the very Cold War nuclear standoff he formally disavowed in inaugurating the new counterterrorist state. The mushroom-cloud imagery, as well as the totalizing immediacy of the threat in his presentation, worked to redeploy a cultural memory of apocalyptic nuclear threat (established during the four decades of the Soviet- American nuclear arms race) as part of the new "war on terror." The new color-coded terrorist warning system (first proposed by Project East River in 1952 to deal with Soviet bombers), as well as the more recent transformation of shampoo bottles on planes into a totalizing threat by the Homeland Security Administration, are official efforts to install and regulate fear in everyday life.24 In this regard, the "war on terror" has been conducted largely as an emotional management campaign in the United States, using the tropes and logics developed during the early Cold War to enable a new kind of U.S. geopolitical project. The "war on terror" redirects but also reiterates the American assumptions about mass violence and democracy I have explored in this essay.¶ If the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, D. C, felt strangely familiar to many U.S. citizens, it was because American society has been imaginatively rehearsing the destruction of these cities for over three generations: in the civil defense campaigns of the early and late Cold War, as well as the Hollywood blockbusters of the 1990s, which destroyed these cities each summer with increasing nuance and detail. The genealogy of this form of entertainment is traumatic, it goes back to the specific way in which the United States entered the nuclear age with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the specific propaganda campaigns informing nuclear threat throughout the Cold War. Indeed, the ease with which the September 11, 2001, attacks were nationalized as part of a nuclear discourse by the Bush administration has much to do with this legacy (see Kaplan 2003). Not coincidentally, the two graphic measures of nuclear blast damage most frequently used during the Cold War were the Pentagon and the New York City skyline (cf. Eden 2004). Figures 8 and 9, for example, are taken from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission campaign to document the size of the first U.S. hydrogen bomb test from 1952. Fourteen true-to-scale versions of the Pentagon (identified by the AEC as the largest building in the world) are placed inside the blast crater (the former Elugelab Island) to document its size, while the New York skyline is used to demonstrate the vast horizontal and vertical scope of the detonation. The events of 9/11 were easily nationalized and transformed into a nuclear discourse precisely because our security culture has imagined and rehearsed attacks on Washington and New York for generations, and because the specific symbols in the attacks (the Pentagon and the tallest building in the New York sky line) were also used by the nuclear state for three generations as part of its emotional management strategy.

The Bush administration, in other words, mobilized a well-established logic of nuclear attack to pursue its policy objectives, translating discrete, nonnuclear threats into the emotional equivalent of the Cold War nuclear crisis.¶ For a nation that constructs itself via discourses of ruination, it should not be a surprise to see the exportation of ruins on a global scale. As President Musharraf clearly understood, the "with us or against us" logic of the Bush administration in 2001 left no ambiguity about the costs of Pakistan not aligning with the sole global superpower. The threat to reduce Pakistan to the "Stone Age" is the alternative, international deployment of nuclear fear, constituting a U.S. promise to reduce his country to a prenational, pretechnological state. Thus, the United States enters the 21st century as a nation both fascinated and traumatized by nuclear ruins. It transforms real and imagined mass death into a nationalized space, and supports a political culture that believes bombing campaigns can produce democracy abroad. It is simultaneously terrorized by nuclear weapons and threatens to use them. The U.S. military both wages preemptive war over nascent "WMD" programs and is preparing to build a new generation of U.S. nuclear weapons.25 American society is today neither "atomic bomb proof nor capable of engaging nuclear technologies as a global problem of governance. Instead, U.S. citizens live today in the emotional residues of the Cold War nuclear arms race, which can only address them as fearful docile bodies. Thus, even in the 21st century, Americans remain caught between terror and fear, trapped in the psychosocial space defined by the once and future promise of nuclear ruins.¶

#### Studies prove that the more specific forecasts are the less probable they are – causes flawed threat evaluation that results in serial policy failure

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**The conjunction fallacy** similarly **applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities.** (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight *from* Thailand *to* the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. **According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story *must* render the story less probable.** It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. **Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that *adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible.* People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare *by China,* than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack *from any source.* The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful *because* it is more vague.** More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. **Security expert Bruce Schneier observed** (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) **that the U.S. government was guarding *specific* domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to *any* disaster.** (Schneier 2005.)

#### That genocidal violence creates priming that psychologically structures escalation

**Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4**

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(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

# 1NR

The theory of deterrence is wrong- they ignore cognative bias and relative perspectives- empirical examples like Pearl Harbor prove miscalculation

Larkin ’11 (Colonel Sean P. Larkin, USAF, is Commander of the Global Threat Analysis Group, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, “The Limits of Tailored Deterrence”, issue 63, 4th quarter 2011)

Deterrence is back. Although the Cold War concept lost its centrality in security policy for many years, the United States embraced a modified version of it in its 2006 and 2010 National Security Strategies.1 The original concept of deterrence—preventing an attack by credibly threatening unacceptable retaliation—has been reborn as tailored deterrence. Tailored deterrence seeks to customize whole-of-government deterrence strategies to specific actors and scenarios. Ideally, this approach would address the flaws in rational deterrence theory, which assumes that adversaries will make decisions exclusively on the basis of the expected costs and benefits of a contemplated course of action. However, the U.S. approach to tailored deterrence largely ignores decades of theoretical development and criticism of rational deterrence theory. The Department of Defense (DOD) Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO–JOC) describes a deterministic approach that combines rational deterrence theory with effects-based operations concepts. Consequently, tailored deterrence neglects some of the most important elements of contemporary deterrence theory, including the uncertainty and cognitive biases inherent both to intelligence assessments and to international relations. While deterrence remains relevant, the U.S. objective to “decisively influence the adversary’s decision-making calculus”2 overstates tailored deterrence’s potential and does not adequately acknowledge its shortfalls. The U.S. approach to tailored deterrence is flawed because of its reliance on two erroneous assumptions: that the Nation can reliably assess an adversary’s decision calculus, and that it can decisively influence an adversary’s choices. The United States must recognize that deterrence is a blunt instrument, not a scalpel, and modify its deterrence strategies accordingly. Deterrence Definition and Requirements The persistent popularity of deterrence can largely be attributed to its apparent simplicity. It is not difficult to understand the concept of intimidating or otherwise convincing an adversary not to take an action. DOD defines deterrence as “prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction.”3 Theorists further subdivide deterrence into two categories: deterrence by punishment is the threat of retaliation if an adversary takes an action; deterrence by denial is the threat of successfully defeating an adversary’s action.Most theorists and practitioners agree on deterrence’s requirements. A deterring actor must communicate to an opponent a credible threat that is of sufficient magnitude to change the results of the opponent’s cost-benefit analysis.5 However, agreement on deterrence’s broad definition and requirements has not settled the long-running dispute over its effectiveness or proper role in national security policy. More than a half century of debate has produced a diverse, compelling, and incomplete collection of theories that cannot reliably predict or explain deterrence success or failure. Evolution of Deterrence Theory The advent of the nuclear age elevated the concept of deterrence to prominence in U.S. academic and governmental circles. Deterrence was particularly attractive to many American academics since it was consistent with the Realist school of international relations to which they already subscribed.6 Although deterrence was an old concept, the incomparably destructive power of nuclear weapons and Cold War bipolarity triggered a theoretical quest for a complete understanding of the art of intimidation. Robert Jervis adroitly categorized the development of deterrence theory into three waves.7 The first wave of deterrence theory emerged immediately after World War II as academics struggled to understand the implications of the atomic bomb for war and international relations. Bernard Brodie and others led the wave with their 1946 book, The Absolute Weapon, which presciently discussed the possibility of a nuclear arms race and remarked that in “the atomic age the threat of retaliation is probably the strongest single means of determent.”8 The authors grasped the Pyrrhic nature of victory in a nuclear exchange, leading to Brodie’s famous observation that the U.S. military must shift its focus from winning wars to averting them.9 The second wave of deterrence theory followed in the 1950s. Confronted with the nuclear-armed superpower standoff that first-wave theorists predicted, second-wave scholars sought to define how to prevent a disarming Soviet first strike. In 1958, Albert Wohlstetter warned that a small nuclear arsenal would be insufficient for deterrence, and counseled that “to deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it.”10 Thomas Schelling employed game theory to demonstrate that the probability of conflict between adversaries depends on their perceptions of each other’s intentions and their fear of being attacked first.11 Thus, a secure second-strike capability and clearly communicating a threat to retaliate became the bedrock of second-wave theory. These theorists also grappled with the concept of extended deterrence. Schelling considered deterrent threats to respond to an attack on the defender’s homeland inherently credible, while threats to extend deterrence to allies “must be made credible.”12 Second-wave theorists postulated several ways to make extended deterrence threats convincing, including maintaining a reputation of loyalty to one’s allies, stationing forces in defended countries, and convincing the adversary that retaliation would be essentially automatic. 13 Perhaps the most powerful aspect of second-wave extended deterrence theory was Schelling’s “threat that leaves something to chance.” This concept holds that ambiguous or implausible threats can still deter aggression between nuclear powers since even a conventional test of extended deterrence risks inadvertent nuclear war.14 Second-wave deterrence theory is also known as rational deterrence theory since it relies on specific assumptions about the actors involved. First, rational deterrence theory assumes that the actors are rational and that they will make choices that maximize their expected utility according to microeconomic theory. In other words, actors will always make decisions in order to maximize their gains and minimize their losses. Second, the theory relies on a principle explanatory assumption: the only difference between actors’ behavior stems from differing opportunities, not other influences such as culture or norms. Third, consistent with its Realist origins, second-wave theory assumes that states will behave as if they are unitary actors—the theory does not address leadership personalities or internal politics.15 In addition to rational deterrence theory’s three formal assumptions, there are several implied requirements. The theory is limited in scope since it only deals with hostile relationships between states.16 The theory requires that actors incorporate new information into their decisionmaking process, so they realize when a prospective gain has turned into a loss. Actors must also consider the probabilities of various possible outcomes when making a decision.17 Finally, the theory’s principle explanatory assumption implies that all actors have the same risk tolerance.18 Second-wave theory proved persuasive, and Washington dutifully implemented many of its prescriptions.19 The United States developed a large nuclear second-strike capability, strove to establish the credibility of its extended deterrence commitments, and occasionally attempted to make Moscow doubt Washington’s restraint.20 Second-wave deterrence theory provided a cost-effective way for the Nation to pursue the ends of its containment strategy. Robert Jervis identified the third wave of deterrence theory as beginning in the 1970s with the search for evidence to support or refute the second wave.21 The third wave successfully applied both empirical analysis and psychology to question the assumptions and implications of secondwave theory. Empirical analysis, most famously Alexander George and Robert Smoke’s 1974 Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, found that the history of conventional deterrence failures did not support the predictions of second-wave theory. Even when the theoretical conditions for success (that is, commitment, communication, and a credible threat) were met, deterrence often failed in the real world.22 Third-wave theory contended that the second wave failed to incorporate critical factors, including variations in the aggressors’ risk-taking propensity, utility of rewards in addition to threats, and influence of domestic politics on decisionmakers.23 The third wave also focused more analytical effort on the aggressor’s decisionmaking process as opposed to the second wave’s nearly exclusive emphasis on the credibility of the defender’s threats.24 Consequently, third-wave theorists sought to demonstrate that psychological factors often cause decisionmakers to behave in ways that contradict rational deterrence theory’s assumptions. Misperception is one of the most important psychological factors—the defender may misunderstand the threat, and the aggressor may fail to appreciate the defender’s resolve and/or capability to retaliate.25 Contrary to the requirements of rational deterrence theory, third-wave theory proposes that decisionmakers are not good at estimating risks and cannot make fine adjustments to cost-benefit analysis based on anything but the most drastic change in probabilities.26 Similarly, powerful cognitive biases affect both sides of the deterrence relationship. Since people prefer consistency to dissonant information, actors are likely to interpret new information in accordance with preexisting beliefs.27 Despite the success of the empirical and psychological approach in casting doubt on rational deterrence theory, third-wave theory did not resolve the deficiencies it identified. 28 No grand unified theory of deterrence emerged in the decades after Jervis identified the trend. Third-wave deterrence theory did not replace rational deterrence theory, but it did create an intellectual counterweight to its influential antecedent. Deterrence theory continued to evolve in concept and application as theorists and strategists reframed their views to reflect significant world events. The end of the Cold War shifted attention from the Soviet Union to deterring rogue states; the 9/11 attacks stimulated more discussion of deterring nonstate actors and their sponsors. Ultimately, the United States sought an approach that would apply to the entire spectrum of challenges. U.S. Policy and Tailored Deterrence President George W. Bush’s administration introduced the term tailored deterrence into U.S. national policy documents in 2006 with the release of the administration’s second National Security Strategy (NSS) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). These documents represented a major shift in national security policy, as President Bush’s 2002 NSS had downplayed the effectiveness of deterrence and advocated preventive war to remove threats from rogue states.29 Four years and one such preventive war later, however, the Bush administration resurrected and reinvented deterrence. The 2006 QDR heralded a shift “from ‘one size fits all’ deterrence to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks and nearpeer competitors.”30 The QDR offered few details on how the new brand of deterrence would operate; the 2006 DO–JOC served this purpose. The Obama administration appears to have continued the Bush-era tailored deterrence policy unaltered. The 2010 NSS and QDR discuss tailored deterrence in much the same terms as their 2006 predecessors.31 According to the 2010 QDR: “Credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments will demand tailored approaches to deterrence. Such tailoring requires an in-depth understanding of the capabilities, values, intent, and decision making of potential adversaries, whether they are individuals, networks, or states. Deterrence also depends on integrating all aspects of national power.”32 Defining Tailored Deterrence. Despite the change in administrations, the 2006 DO–JOC remains the definitive opensource description of the U.S. approach to tailored deterrence. U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) led the creation of the document, but it reflects a DOD-wide concept that was approved by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.33 Since its publication, USSTRATCOM leaders have repeatedly reemphasized the DO–JOC’s principles for “waging deterrence,” finding them “perfectly satisfactory” as recently as 2010.34 The DO–JOC seeks to describe how DOD will work with the rest of the U.S. Government to “decisively influence the adversary’s decision-making calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital interests.”35 The Nation must identify which adversaries it wishes to deter and what actions they are to be deterred from taking, then tailor operations to the characteristics of each adversary and scenario.36 The DO–JOC assumes that adversary decisions to act or not are based on deliberate calculations of the value and probability of the outcome of alternate courses of action. It also assumes that the United States can identify and assess at least some elements of each adversary’s decision calculus.37 Beyond these assumptions, the DO–JOC breaks the adversary decision calculus down into three elements: benefits of an action, costs of an action, and consequences of restraint (that is, what could happen if the adversary does not take the contemplated action). The DO–JOC also assumes that the United States will be able to influence at least some adversary “values and perceptions relevant to their decision-making.”38 It states that the methods the Nation will employ to achieve its ends will be “credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs while encouraging restraint.”39 The DO–JOC envisions military deterrence operations as part of a larger national deterrence strategy that integrates all elements of national power. These interagency activities are to be conducted on a daily basis during peacetime, crisis, and war.40 The DO–JOC purports to offer “a new approach to understanding the ways and means necessary to achieve the ends of deterrence.” 41 Despite the document’s use of an effects-based operations and transformational lexicon, however, the DO–JOC describes little that is new. When compared to its theoretical roots, tailored deterrence appears to be old wine in a new jar. What Theory Drives the Practice? The DO–JOC approach to tailored deterrence— “credibly threatening to deny benefits and/or impose costs while encouraging restraint”42— is an amalgam of second- and third-wave deterrence theory, heavily influenced by effects-based operations concepts. Denying benefits and imposing costs are simply alternate names for deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, respectively. Encouraging restraint incorporates Schelling’s and third-wave theorists’ ideas of offering the adversary reassurance or rewards for maintaining the status quo.43 The DO–JOC relies on many secondwave assumptions but rejects others in favor of third-wave considerations. Consistent with rational deterrence theory, the DO–JOC assumes that choices are based on rational calculations of the expected costs and benefits of an action. Similarly, the DO–JOC accepts second-wave theory’s implied assumption that actors will continually incorporate new information into their decision calculus. However, tailored deterrence rejects second-wave theory’s principle explanatory and unitary rational actor assumptions, requiring instead that each adversary be viewed as a complex system of unique decisionmakers. The DO–JOC also uses third-wave theory by allowing for variations in adversaries’ risk-taking propensities. Nevertheless, tailored deterrence largely ignores some of the most important elements of third-wave theory. The DO–JOC pays little attention to psychological factors that undermine deterrence, including cognitive barriers to perception and decisionmaking. The DO–JOC acknowledges and discusses several areas of uncertainty, but presents these ambiguities as solvable problems rather than inescapable fog and friction. The DO–JOC’s language indicates that tailored deterrence owes more to the deterministic concepts of effects-based operations than it does to the more Clausewitzian cautions of third-wave deterrence theory. Although effects-based operations concepts were never fully incorporated into joint doctrine, two elements that were absorbed— effects and systems perspective—had a profound impact on tailored deterrence. First, the DO–JOC states that deterrence planning must include identifying what effects the United States desires to have on an adversary’s decision calculus.44 The doctrinal use of effects leads the DO–JOC to seek measures of effectiveness in order to assess the success or failure of deterrent actions. The document initially acknowledges *the near impossibility* of measuring the contribution of deterrent actions to adversary restraint. However, the DO–JOC goes on quixotically to discuss how such elusive metrics should be constructed.45 This approach to assessment clearly emphasizes the deterministic perspective of effectsbased operations over the views of both second- and third-wave deterrence theorists, who maintain that deterrence success is difficult to assess in historical retrospect, much less in real time.46 Second, and more revealing, is the DO–JOC’s statement that “a systems approach to understanding the adversary and the operating environment underpins deterrence operations.”47 The systems perspective in joint doctrine emphasizes understanding an adversary by constructing models of interrelated systems in order to identify effects and centers of gravity.48 As many critics have pointed out, however, the systems approach is most appropriate for understanding and predicting effects on closed systems, such as electrical powergrids. Open systems, such as societies and national leadership structures, tend to defy both the systems approach to understanding them and deterministic, effects-based attempts to influence them.49 Assessing the Adversary Decision Calculus Tailored deterrence requires that the United States understand each adversary’s decision calculus with a high level of certainty in order to design deterrent actions that will achieve decisive influence over adversaries’ choices. However, tailored deterrence’s assumptions oversimplify the basis on which people make decisions. People make choices based in part on their perceptions of expected utility, but they are also influenced by other factors, including their personal perspectives and cognitive biases. Many of these factors are enigmatic even to the actors themselves, making the decision calculus exceptionally difficult to assess and leaving adversaries’ choices largely unpredictable. History *provides many examples of deterrence failures in which the defender misunderstood the adversary’s decision calculus* and was therefore surprised by an “irrational” action. Keith Payne cites the *Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, China’s entry into the Korean War, and the Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba* as examples in which U.S. estimates of the adversary decision calculus predicted the opposite outcome.50 Janet Gross Stein uses Egypt’s *1973 surprise attack against Israel and Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait* as other case studies of deterrence failures.51 In all these examples, the defenders assessed that their presumably rational adversary would refrain from action because upsetting the status quo would result in a net loss. However, the deterrence failures listed above cannot be attributed to irrationality. As Keith Payne observed, there is an often unappreciated difference between rational and reasonable decisionmaking.52 If actors are rational, they make decisions that logically link to their objectives. However, whether or not an actor’s decisions are reasonable is a matter of perspective. If an outside observer does not share or understand the adversary’s goals and values, the adversary’s decisions may appear unreasonable, and will therefore be unpredictable.53 Second-wave theory and tailored deterrence both correctly assume that irrational actors are rare, but fail to appreciate how little this assumption matters when compared to the impact of the actors’ divergent perspectives on a deterrence relationship. The Adversary’s Perspective. Opposing leaders frequently see the world uniquely because of the large differences in the leaders’ individual expectations and beliefs. Cognitive psychology shows that all people develop unique belief systems, or schemata, based on their experiences, to help organize and interpret information. These schemata are necessary to functioning in a complex world, but they also “constrain and condition how and what leaders perceive.”54 As a result of these differing contexts, leaders may interpret the same situation quite differently. For example, while the United States confidently concluded that China would stay out of the Korean War, Mao Zedong attacked the U.S. Eighth Army in North Korea because he probably believed China was being encircled by America.55 Leaders’ perceptions are also shaped by the mental shortcuts, or heuristics, that all people use to selectively process and recall information. One of the most powerful heuristics results in the availability bias—the tendency for people to interpret events in terms of other events they can easily remember. 56 This results in leaders being disproportionately influenced by historical events that they or their country experienced directly.57 Saddam Hussein’s perspective on combat in the Iran-Iraq War led him to disregard U.S. airpower; he similarly concluded from the U.S. experience in Lebanon that America was casualty averse and would not be able to remove him from Kuwait.58 Third-wave theory also maintains that domestic political considerations are often a critical factor in adversaries’ decisions. This factor is consistent with Jervis’s observation that leaders often make a decision based on one value dimension (for example, domestic politics) without fully considering its impact on other dimensions.59 Thus, Anwar Sadat’s primary concerns in 1973 were domestic politics, regaining lost honor, and the consequences of not attacking, rather than the probable military outcome.60 The Deterrer’s Perspective. In its estimation of the adversary decision calculus, the United States is constrained by the same cognitive barriers that influence an adversary’s viewpoint, as well as other **biases** that commonly **undermine intelligence analysis//////////////** and policymaking. Intelligence estimates are prone to the bias of mirror-imaging, which is the assumption that the adversary thinks and operates like the analyst’s country.61 Mirror-imaging is closely related to the availability heuristic, since when reliable intelligence is lacking, analysts and policymakers will tend to fill in the blanks with information that is readily recalled: their nation’s capabilities, plans, and intentions. For example, Israel’s emphasis on airpower drove it to judge Egypt’s readiness in 1973 by an Israeli standard. Due to this mirror-imaging, Israel ignored compelling evidence of an imminent Egyptian attack, believing that Sadat would be deterred at least until Egypt reconstituted its air force.62 Analysts also tend to be biased toward viewing the adversary’s actions as the result of centralized direction and to underestimate other explanations, such as coincidences, accidents, or mistakes.63 The centralized direction bias is particularly troublesome for the analysis of an adversary decision calculus since it causes analysts to “overestimate the extent to which other countries are pursuing coherent, rational, goal-maximizing policies” and to “overestimate the predictability of future events in other countries.”64 The power of this bias and the unpredictability of even a wellknown adversary were highlighted in 1962, shortly before the United States discovered Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Washington erroneously concluded in a Special National Intelligence Estimate that the Soviet Union would not put offensive weapons in Cuba because such a move would be inconsistent with the observed patterns of Soviet behavior and American estimates of Nikita Khrushchev’s decision calculus.65 Decisionmakers may also be affected by motivated biases, which result from subconscious psychological pressure that distorts perception. Motivated biases differ from cognitive biases because the source of the error is the person’s fear and needs, rather than expectations or cognitive limits.66 This tendency results in defensive avoidance techniques to **selectively process information** that supports their favored policy to reduce anxiety. In May 1967, pressure from domestic and Arab constituencies probably motivated Egypt’s overestimation of its chances of winning a war with Israel. Egypt’s leaders initially assessed that war would result in low benefits and high costs. However, contrary to rational deterrence theory’s requirements, Egypt’s leaders reversed their estimate a few weeks later and chose war.67

#### Economic crisis rhetoric causes a self-fulfilling prophecy – rhetoric and framing circumscribes the possibilities for political action

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“Economic crisis rhetoric” describes the art of mitigating or **exacerbating crises** in capitalism through discourse. Since at least the Great Depression there has existed an awareness in the public sphere that the language used to discuss the economy impacts the economy’s actual performance.12 In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, John Maynard Keynes coined the term “animal spirits” to refer to the seemingly emotional and affective nature of economic markets.13 According to Keynes—one of the most respected economists of all time—the economy was as much a **product of language** as it was about concrete fundamentals. Because the economy was **ultimately held together by confidence**—“an immaterial device of the mind”—the way public officials spoke about the economy could play a **powerful role** in how the economy was actually experienced.14 During the current economic crisis the Keynesian perspective that confidence shapes the economy has become increasingly mainstream.”15 Early in 2009, for example, Newsweek columnist Jonathan Alter speculated that Barack Obama’s greatest challenge as president would be to “talk” Americans out of the ongoing economic recession.16 Suggesting that the biggest obstacle facing the nation is essentially a crisis of confidence, Alter argues that the president can only restore popular faith in the economy (and, by extension, the economy itself) through the strategic use of language: What's a president to do? If he starts in with the happy talk, he sounds like John McCain saying "the fundamentals of the economy are strong," which is what sealed the election for Obama in the first place. But if he gets too gloomy, he'll scare the **bejesus** out of the entire world. The balance Obama strikes is to say that things will get worse before they get better, but that they will get better. Now he must convince us that's true. While Alter’s comments serve as the latest proof of rhetoric’s compelling power to affect the economy’s material performance, in the discipline of communication studies there has been little research exploring the role of language in mitigating and exacerbating capitalist crises.17 This lack of scholarship is **unfortunate** given that in contemporary communication studies one of the central assumptions is that under late capitalism rhetoric has become increasingly central to all social life.18 In a globalized and mass mediated society increasingly defined by “immaterial production,”19 rhetoric is **central** to how human beings **make sense of the world** and how they **direct their actions toward particular objectives**.20 In this respect, there is every reason to believe that rhetoric functions similarly in the context of economic crises and the purpose of this literature review is to substantiate the basis for making such claims.

The rhetoric of “soft power” is a discursive move to insulate US Hegemony from criticism and obfuscates the fact that the ontological impulse is fundamentally the same as neoconservative calls for global dominance

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American neoconservative thinkers have the virtue of not retorting to cosmopolitan rhetoric, when talking about U. S. foreign policy. They insist that there is no alternative to American leadership. Many states have benefited from the world order created by U. S. power, and if the United States failed, the rest of the world would be in a much worse situation [Kagan, 1998]. Especially after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, many scholars argued for the necessity of a benevolent hegemony, which will have as its first objective the preservation and enhancement of U. S. predominance by strengthening its security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests and standing up for its principles around the world [Kristol and Kagan, 1996]. Proponents of the "Benevolent Hegemon" Thesis discredit European criticisms of American policy; Europeans, it is said, are free to live in peace because there are Americans who safeguard diis peace [Kagan, 2002]. For this benevolent hegemony to be consolidated, U. S. supremacy is necessary, together with the order it secures. The U. S. strategy appears in this view as an aggressive effort to safeguard capitalist social relations on a global scale; to make sure that all the institutional arrangements necessary for the internationalization of capital are in place all over the world, and that there are no obstacles to capital accumulation. While U. S. strategy supports American firms and investments overseas, it also promotes a global collective capitalist interest. It defends U. S. hegemony in the imperialist chain as the most powerful capitalist state and the only state capable of safeguarding the long-term interest of all the major capitalist states, and in this way to make sure that there will be no contestation of U. S. predominance. It is on the basis of this effort to represent the global collective capitalist interest, and not sheer arrogance, that the national security strategy is very clear: the United States will not hesitate to attack anyone [even a present ally] who opposes its dominant position.